The Reform the Military Is Already Undertaking: Chickenhawk, No. 19

The theme in this installment is a number of worthwhile (in my view), powerful links and posts on the general question of self-criticism within the military, and joint civilian and military efforts to direct real attention to the chickenhawk pathology.

1) "Stick Your Neck Out," by two junior naval officers, LT Roger Misso and LTJG Chris O'Keefe, on the US Naval Institute site. They are arguing for creative ferment among the young officer class:

We need junior officers willing to stick their necks out and write. Our service and our country are dealing with serious challenges, many of which may have non-traditional solutions. This generation of junior officers will be judged for our courage to stand up and work to solve those problems. The nation can no longer afford our silence.

2) Stay in and fight. Also from a junior naval officer, in response to episode No. 18 in the chickenhawk saga, in which young Captain X and Captain Y explained why they had decided to resign:

Nothing will ever change if these officers leave the service. These are exactly the kind of people who should stay IN the service! The young men and women who can clearly identify that there is a problem, and an impediment to the solution.  Yet, rather than risking it by continuing to push for the solution, or teach others how to push for a solution and later achieve critical mass, they leave the service.

I want 2015 to be the year we change all that. Despite the pressure that says junior officers can't write about contentious issues, this must be the year we "get each other's backs." Our Navy—our military—is strongest when we engage in respectful, open, well-informed debates about our most important issues. The theme of "Stick Your Neck Out" is that it doesn't matter if writing or expressing a respectful, serious opinion gets you fired—but if you fail to do this because you are worried about your career, then you are actually hurting the service.

Too many junior officers [JOs]will read your piece from Capt X and Capt Y and think "there is no way I can change this" and then leave the service.  But the message we want to spread is: this HAS to change.  And the only way it can change is well-informed, courageous JOs willing to do the right thing by speaking out or writing on a better way forward.  So what if we get fired by the wrong kind of senior officers along the way?

3) "The Army's Other Crisis," by Andrew Tilghman in The Washington Monthly eight years ago on this exact issue of leaving versus staying and fighting. "The problem isn't one of numbers alone: The Army also appears to be losing its most gifted young officers."

4) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, by Albert O. Hirschman, the absolute-bedrock treatment of issues #1, #2, and #3 on this list.

5) "Bridging the Gap: The Civilian-Military Divide." I am so sorry I hadn't seen this film before I wrote the article! I have now seen it via a preview reel. You should ask you PBS station to show it sometime soon. Here's a preview:

6) The challenges of irregular war. From a reader with extensive government-service experience:

If you've never read the article "Less is More: The Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an Era of Collapsing States" by Hy Rothstein, I highly recommend it.  The article appeared in the February, 2007 edition of Third World Quarterly. [JF note: a paywalled version is here.]

The core of Rothstein's argument cuts to the heart of why the U.S. military keeps losing wars.  An extended excerpt:

"The American strategic culture is not so flexible.  As a result, irregular threats are handled quantitatively, based on the level of importance or threat posed to U.S. interests, even if a quantitative approach undermines the accomplishment of strategic outcomes.  Threrefore it seems that, for irregular threats, particularly those where local government legitimacy is in question, U.S. success is inversely related to the priority senior U.S. officials (civilian and military) attach to the effort.  Only when the issue at stake is of secondary importance can the U.S. response result in a thoughtful, tailored approach to a non-standard threat."  

Another good excerpt:

"But, there are features of both the USA's 'small wars' and its 'big wars' that are troubling and limiting.  Both reveal the USA's military imperative for quantitatively oriented solutions and both are more a way of battle than a way of war, since they fall short of serious thinking about turning military victory into successful policy outcomes."  

Rothstein goes on to look at three relative U.S. successes - El Salvador, 1980-1994; the Philippines, 2001-2005; and the early phases of the current fight in Afghanistan.  In each case, Rothstein argues that limited resources and autonomy for local commanders (vs. micromanagement from DC and a massive influx of money and troops and civilians) made the difference between success and failure.

I find Rothstein's argument very compelling.  I work for [an executive-branch department]  and I see here too how once Big Washington takes over an issue it can quickly destroy it by demanding short-term results, beating the nuance out of any policy, and valuing domestic political considerations over any optimal policy outcome.

Also, once Big Washington takes over, people in the field spend more time reporting back to Washington than they do focusing on solutions to the problem at hand.  Finally, Washington has a tendency to micromanage operations in the field, but how well can anyone in Washington truly understand something as complex as Helmand Province or Anbar?  Instead, once the Washington bureaucracy seizes hold of an issue, it throws money, B-52s and civilian contractors at it until the issue goes away.

For this reason, I'm actually somewhat hopeful about the U.S. effort against ISIS.  The limited U.S. approach is causing endless handwringing among chickenhawks in the U.S. who continue to argue for boots on the ground, but I find it hard to believe that U.S. combat troops would do any better than the current approach.  More than anything this is a battle for legitimacy in the Sunni parts of Iraq, and only the Iraqi government can win that battle.  

7) An expanded reading list. From another young officer, on ferment underway:

I would like to bring your attention to some works and venues used by JO's and not-so-JO's. I really do hope that, perhaps, folks like you and Tom Ricks who want to do good work don't fall to the temptation of the our most... fed up.

You'll excuse the prolific list here, but I think it important for you to see at least the very slim edge of what is available out there.

Most close to home to your recent topics, almost ALL "The Bridge" (run y Army and AF J(ish)O's) material recently has been JO/not-so-JO discussions on the nature of "profession" as military personnel:
https://medium.com/the-bridge

You should look in to LT Ben Kohlmann's "Defense Entrepreneurs Forum" with two highly successful conferences and an innovation competition under it's belt:
http://defenseentrepreneurs.org/

CIMSEC is another instution run by a mess of JO's (and civilians):
http://cimsec.org/staff

John Paris's series on comparing and reforming the Navy's surface community:
http://cimsec.org/virtue-generalist-part-1-day-life-sub-lieutenant-snodgrass/11907
http://cimsec.org/virtue-generalist-part-2-nuggets-created-equal/12200

http://cimsec.org/virtue-generalist-part-3-viper-pitfalls-good-enough/12575

A Podcast on the topic:
http://cimsec.org/sea-control-47-british-american-surface-warfare-officers/12568

Two pieces on training problems:
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014-10/performance-over-process

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-04/nobody-asked-me-%E2%80%98choreographed%E2%80%99-training-dancing

CDR Snodgrass build his own, independent 3rd Party retention study:
http://www.dodretention.org/blog/

On our lack of tactical training: (note, this is a specific issue brought up by many has actually been talken up by a three-star)
http://blog.usni.org/2012/05/30/what-the-professional-naval-conversation-is-missing-tactics

http://cimsec.org/navy-tactics-re-finding-our-purpose/958

LCDR BJ Armstrong has actually written TWO books in an attempt to guide modern officers and make relevant the stories and works of Mahan and ADM Sims:
(Mahan)http://www.amazon.com/21st-Century-Mahan-Military-Conclusions/dp/1612512437/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1422318609&sr=1-1&keywords=21st+Century+Mahan&pebp=1422318611727&peasin=1612512437
(sims)http://www.amazon.com/21st-Century-Sims-Innovation-Leadership/dp/1612518109/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1422318600&sr=1-1&keywords=21st+Century+Sims&pebp=1422318604239&peasin=1612518109&pebp=1422318604243&peasin=1612518109&pebp=1422318604246&peasin=1612518109

Matthew Hipple on China:
http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/china-leap-frogging-u-s-deterrence-in-the-pacific/
http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/unseen-gains-of-the-pla-objects-in-mirror-are-closer-than-they-appear/
http://warontherocks.com/2013/11/how-war-with-china-would-start-99-red-balloons/

Sequestration:
http://blog.usni.org/2013/02/15/sequestration-americas-great-harbor

Training:
http://cimsec.org/navy-tactics-re-finding-our-purpose/958

Sea Swap:
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-07/nobody-asked-me-sea-swap-it%E2%80%99s-trap

And some... impassioned responses to the recent disregard to the reality of our rich, debating culture:
http://cimsec.org/debating-military-youre-listening/10941

http://cimsec.org/is-there-a-military-millennial-problem-twelve-responses-to-cdr-darcie-cunningham/12481

There are many out there: Rich Ganske, Dave Blair, Nic Dileonardo, Roger Misso, Chris O'keefe, BJ Armstrong, Scott Cheney-Peters, Claude Berube, Nathan Finney, Ben Kohlmann, and - really - hundreds more with their own personal blogs, one-off articles, and encouragement they give aspiring JO's with an inkling to think, write, and dare.

From our foreign policy on China, to our organizational culture, to tactics in the field, to technical innovations - it seems that, too often, our journalists and academics seek out the well meaning but bitter, "this sucks, I'm out" JO's who make a dramatic splash. They are not where you are going to find the reality of the troubles, and opportunities, of our armed forces.

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Here is the running index of previous installments:

This article was originally published at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/01/chickenhawk-next/384863/